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Investing in an Emerging Mortgage 
Backed Securities Market: The Case of 
Korea Housing Finance Corporation1
Seung-Dong You2
Introduction
Korea Housing Finance Corporation (KHFC) is poised to change the structure of the 
Korean housing finance industry. KHFC is proposing innovative fixed rate long-term 
loans, which will fulfill an unmet demand among Korean homebuyers, and plans to 
offer long term Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS) in the bond market.
This article provides information on the emerging Korean mortgage market, a framework 
for establishment of this new Government Sponsored Enterprise (GSE) and characteristics 
of the KHFC MBS product. First, it presents current conditions of the secondary mortgage 
market in Korea. Second, it discusses the process and rationale for the establishment of 
KHFC. And finally, it introduces the KHFC home mortgage loan and the KHFC MBS.
The Immature Secondary Mortgage Market
Although the MBS vehicle3 has become an effective instrument in the Korean housing 
finance market during a very short period of time, the amount of MBS issuance has not 
increased substantially due to unfavorable market conditions4. One of the main rea­
sons is that commercial banks with high deposit balances wish to keep profitable home 
loans in their portfolios and do not sell them to the secondary mortgage market. 
Therefore, the amount of MBS issuance is much smaller than that of Asset Backed 
Securities (ABS). In 2003, the amount of MBS issuance was 326.6 billion won5, a mere 
0.83% of ABS issuance (please refer to Table I for further illustration).
Table 1: ABS and MBS Issuance
Unit: Billion Won
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
ABS (A)<4 67,710 48,004 50,096 38,876 39,556
MBS (B) 1,379 838 952 327
B/A*100 2.87% 1.67% 2.45% 0.83%
Note: 40 The amount of MBS issued under the ABS Act is excluded 
Source: Financial Supervisor Services (FSS)
2Seung-Dong You (MPS/RE ’02) is a graduate of the Program in Real Estate, Cornell
University. He is currently an employee of KHPC and has been involved in the creation
of KHPC.
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As the majority ofMBS are composed of senior tranches, a MBS vehicle is a cheaper source 
of capital relative to an ABS product. Therein lies one of the important advantages of MBS 
products. For example, 99.7% of MBS issued in 2003 were composed of senior6 tranches 
as compared to 84.2% for ABS products issued in 2003. Even the current small MBS market 
has profoundly affected the long-term bond market in Korea. Bonds with a maturity of 
above five years are considered long-term in the Korean bond market. The issuance ofMBS 
with a lS-year maturity has spurred the availability of bond products with longer maturities.
The creation of a vibrant MBS market is beneficial for the Korean long-term bond market, 
but its current market size leaves little doubt that an MBS vehicle is not yet considered a 
leading financial instrument. In 2003 the amount of MBS issuance was a mere 2.7% of 
stocks issuance and 0.49% of all securities issuance.
The Korean government has addressed the lackluster MBS market by founding KHFC to 
help the housing finance market take-off. This is in many ways similar to the early years of 
the development of the MBS market in the US, which benefited from the support of 
GSEs like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Before the formation of KHFC, Korea Mortgage 
Corporation (KoMoCo), a quasi-government entity, was the major player in the Korean 
secondary mortgage market. However, KoMoCo has not been able to stimulate the MBS 
market sufficiently. The government’s National Housing Fund (NHF) is the largest 
shareholder of KoMoCo, but the majority of KoMoCo is privately owned. Government 
policy makers have concluded that a company owned and controlled completely by the 
government can develop the housing finance market faster than KoMoCo, which is trying 
to satisfy both private and public interests.
Establishment of Korea Housing Finance 
Corporation
The Korean Government’s aim in enacting the Korea Housing Finance Corporation Act 
(KHFC Act) and forming KHFC is to foster the secondary mortgage market as well as to 
reduce financial risks in the primary mortgage market. Launched in 2004, KHFC is a power­
ful entity equipped with many strong policy instruments to promote the secondary mort­
gage market. First, the scope of underlying assets for MBS has now been broadened so that 
more loans are eligible for securitization. Any mortgage loan classified as a general loan can 
now be securitized. In Korea, mortgages can be classified into two categories: the general 
loan or the mortgage loan. Second, the ‘buy and hold’ (so called ‘portfolio investment’) 
business has been introduced to reduce originators’ financial burdens. Third, the new GSE 
is allowed to choose the optimal time for securitization. The GSE can hold mortgage loans 
in its portfolio if  it finds that the market is not right for immediate issuance. Fourth, the 
guarantee limit of the new company has been expanded to S0 times the company’s equity 
capital.7 Fifth, with respect to mortgage loans purchased by the new GSE, when attempting 
to register itself as the authorized holder, it is regarded as a public entity. Again, this is similar 
to the low cost of capital factored in for GSEs like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which are
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widely thought to have an implicit government guarantee.
To create a higher level of public confidence, the new GSE is chartered by a more favorable 
act than the MBS Company Act under which KoMoCo was formed. First, the govern­
ment and Bank of Korea (BOK) wholly financed the capital fund for the company.8 
Second, the account of the KHFC is kept separately from that of Housing Finance Credit 
Guarantee Fund (HFCGF). Third, losses resulting from the settlement of accounts are to 
be covered by a reserve account. When the reserves are insufficient, the government steps 
in to cover the losses. Also, the policy of putting MBS on the list of RP (Repurchase 
Agreement) transactions between the central bank and financial institutions is expected to 
be adopted soon. This should improve the liquidity of MBS in the bond market.
The Emerging MBS Market
KHFC and the government announced their goal to originate home mortgage loans in 
the amount of 4.S trillion won (approximately $3.7S billion) and to issue MBS in the 
amount of 4 trillion won (approximately $3.33 billion) in 2004. Their long-term plan is to 
issue MBS of about 70 trillion won (approximately $58 billion) by 2008. If in fact this goal 
is reached, about half of the mortgage loan market in Korea will be securitized using MBS.
KHFC is originating home mortgage loans through nine financial companies, rather than 
buying mortgage loans already held by commercial institutions in their portfolios. This is 
in contrast to the strategy of KoMoCo, which was unable to obtain mortgage loans from 
commercial banks. KoMoCo issued MBS mostly backed by mortgage loans from Na­
tional Housing Funds managed by the Ministry of Construction and Transportation 
(MoCT). As previously discussed, this did not stimulate the MBS market.
KHFC Revolutionizes The Korean Home 
Mortgage Loan
KHFC home mortgage loan’s interest rate is fixed for 20 years at 6.7% for the first issuance. 
This loan is very innovative because most of the mortgage products originated by other 
private financial companies are short-term, variable rate loans (please refer to Table 2). 
Commercial banks currently supply few fixed rate mortgage products and even if  they do, 
these loans are very expensive with high spreads between variable rate mortgages and fixed 
rate mortgages.9
Table 2: Loan Types (by interest features) originated by Commercial Banks
(Unit: %)
1998 1999 2000 2001
Prime Variable Rate 76.3 72.2 53.1 52.5
Market Variable Rate 9.6 14.2 33.5 34.1
Others 14.1 13.6 13.4 13.4
Total 100 100 100 100
Note: Outstanding balance for eight leading commercial banks 
Source: Bank of Korea (BOK)
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KHFC is introducing these long-term fixed rate mortgage loans to fulfill borrowers’ 
unmet demand and promote the primary mortgage market. With variable rate mort­
gages, homeowners bear the uncertainty of fluctuating interest risks. Currently, because 
banks primarily offer variable rate mortgages and fixed rate funding has a high financing 
cost, borrowers have no choice but to choose variable rate mortgage loans. The maturity 
of these loans is mostly less than S years, with just I3 .l%  of the outstanding balance of 
mortgage loans with maturity greater than S years (please refer to table 3). Banks prefer 
short-term mortgages to manage the maturity mismatch between short-term deposits 
and long-term mortgages. The demand from Korean borrowers for long maturity 
fixed rate loans is evident from a survey conducted by Kookmin Bank in 2003, indicat­
ing that 69.S% of respondents prefer fixed rate mortgages and 23.4% of them hope to 
borrow loans with a maturity greater than 10 years.
Table 3: Maturity of Mortgage Loans
(Unit: %)
1 year or 
less
Greater than 1 
year and less 
than 3 years
Greater than 3 





2001 21.2 52.8 7.6 18.4
2002 18.7 62.6 6.3 12.4
2003 27.7 50 9.1 13.1
Note: Outstanding balance of the end of each year
Source: FSS
KHFC will also enable a lot more borrowers to qualify for home loans. Current loan-to- 
value (LTV) ratios average about 30% in Korea, and these figures are lower than those 
o f other countries. A lower LTV ratio indicates greater protection to the lender if  the 
applicant defaults and it becomes necessary to repossess and sell the property (Fabozzi 
and Modigliani, 1999, p.42). Financial Supervisory Services (FSS) has recommended 
that lending institutions not originate mortgages with more than S0% LTV ratios, 
which is strictly followed by commercial banks (please see Table 4). Commercial banks 
do not have to consider borrower’s risk profile in too much detail, as they are limited to 
such a low LTV ratio. Default risk is very low, and banks benefit from fines charged on 
late payments. FSS has allowed KHFC to originate mortgage loans with a 70% LTV 
ratio, which gives it an ability to reach out to many more borrowers. In turn, FSS requires 
that KHFC examine borrower’s ability to repay the loan more stringently than commer­
cial banks as KHFC has relatively much higher LTV ratios and consequently more risk.
Table 4: New LTV Standards for Mortgage Loans as ofjune 2003
Banks LTV
Kookmin Bank 45% (mortgagor with low credit: 40%)
Korea Exchange Bank, Woori Bank, Hana Bank, 
Korea First Bank,Shinhan Bank, KorAm Bank 50%
Chohung Bank, Industrial Bank of Korea 50% (mortgagor with low credit: 45%)
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Introduction to KHFC MBS
KoMoCo had offered MBS with 96.6% composed of senior tranches as compared to 
83.7% for MBS issued by other companies. A high percentage of senior bonds denotes 
a lower potential risk of loss from underlying assets, as losses from underlying assets are 
first absorbed by junior tranches. KoMoCo MBS are predominantly long-term with 
59% of the bonds showing a maturity of more than five years, and 78% with a maturity 
of more than three years (please refer to Chart I). As opposed to this long-term nature 
of MBS, ABS consists mostly of short-term securities. In ABS, the trend seems to be 
the opposite of MBS, with the percentage of ABS with maturity greater than five years 
decreasing from 5.6% in 1999 to lows of 2.1% in 2003 (please refer to Table 5).
C hart 1: M atu rity  o f  K o M o C o's M BS
More than 10
Table 5: ABS Maturity
Unit Billion Won
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Amount (%) Amount (%) Amount (%) Amount (%) Amount (%)
Below 1 yr 1,189 27.8% 10,833 35.2% 6,792 18.5% 15,830 55.0% 11,097 41.2%
1 yr-2 yrs 931 21.8% 13,174 42.8% 10,914 29.7% 3,541 12.3% 6,727 24.9%
2 yrs-3 yrs 1,084 25.3% 2,769 9.0% 9,498 25.9% 4,248 14.8% 6,027 22.4%
3 yrs-4 yrs 155 3.6% 902 2.9% 6,935 18.9% 3,806 13.2% 1,964 7.3%
4 yrs-5 yrs 680 15.9% 1,771 5.8% 1,286 3.5% 1,045 3.6% 572 2.1%
Above 5 yrs 240 5.6% 1,323 4.3% 1,299 3.5% 307 1.1% 576 2.1%
Total 4,279 100.0% 30,772 100.0% 36,724 100.0% 28,777 100.0% 26,963 100.0%
Note: Privately issued ABS were excluded 
Source: FSS
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The issuance of KHFC MBS would further nurture the long-term bond market. The 
structure of KHFC MBS is presented in Chart 2, while its major features are presented 
in Table 6.
Chart 2: Structure of KHFC MBS
Note:
1) Origination and servicing fees. Originators become servicers after sale of mortgages.
2) Buffers are types of fees that KHFC generates.
Table 6: Major Features of KHFC MBS
Underlying Asset KHFC Home Mortgage Loan
Type of Loans Fixed Rate Mortgages originated by 9 financial companies
Mortgage Rate of 
Underlying Asset
6.7%(First Program)
Weighted Average Coupon NA (3 year Treasury coupon + mortgage yield)
Payment Date Every 3 months
Pool Size(for investor) About 300 Billion Won (Approximately 250 Million Dollar)
Structure Sequential CMO (Pass-Through Type MBS)
Issuer KHFC (Government Sponsored Enterprise)
Guarantor KHFC (Senior MBS)
Guarantee Full and timely payment of interest and principal of senior MBS
Servicing Spread 50 — 65 basis points
Servicer 9 financial companies who sold underlying assets
It is expected that large financial institutions managing long-term portfolios will be 
major KHFC MBS investors. This is similar to KoMoCo MBS whose major investors 
were banks and insurance companies10 as shown in Chart 3. Kim and Heo (2004) claim 
that the Korean long-term bond market has the capability to absorb KHFC MBS 
without any negative impact due to the root shortage of long-term securities.
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A few problems that may still cause inefficiency in the MBS markets are the lack of 
adequate infrastructure such as extensive industry data or Information Technology sys­
tems for analysis, and the lack of a developed long-term bond market in which inves­
tors can effectively analyze and price the MBS market.
Chart 3: Investors o f KoMoCo MBS as of Feb 2003
O thers
Conclusion
A thriving MBS market will advance Korean financial markets, including the long-term 
bond market. One of the main objectives of establishing KHFC was to prevent the 
primary mortgage market from being exposed to systemic risks due to the expansion of 
short-term mortgages with a variable rate after the Korean financial crisis. Until now, 
commercial banks have led the structural change in the primary mortgage market, and 
banks have tried to keep profitable mortgage loans in their own portfolio rather than 
transfer them to the secondary mortgage market through KHFC. Obtaining these 
mortgage loans from commercial banks that have a stronghold on loan origination will 
be one of the main challenges for the successful operation of KHFC. IKHFC’s progress 
in revolutionizing the housing finance market of Korea is worthy of a close watch.
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Endnotes
1 This article is an updated version of “Establishing a New Government Sponsored 
Enterprise, Korea National Mortgage Corporation” on Housing Finance International, 
December 2003. It provides information beginning April 1, 2004.
3 There are three laws that govern mortgage securitization in Korea: The Asset-Backed 
Securitization Act (ABS Act), the Mortgage-Backed Securitization Company Act (MBS 
Company Act), and the Korea Housing Finance Corporation Act(KHFC Act). Whereas the 
ABS Act was established in September 1998 to promote the restructuring of firms and 
financial companies, the MBS company Act was enacted in January 1999 under the rationale 
that mortgage loans could be more effectively securitized by a reliable permanent entity 
rather than by a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) with a limited life.(Lee (2003)) The KHFC Act 
was enacted on December 23, 2003. The KHFC Act states that the mission of KHFC is to 
contribute to the development of the national economy and to promote the housing 
welfare through the long-term and stable supply of housing funds through securitizations 
such as mortgage-backed securities and credit guarantee business.
4 Lee (2003) studies in depth issues for promoting mortgage securitization.
5 After the second quarter of 2004, when the government announced KoMoCo’s merger 
with KHFC, KoMoCo could not issue additional MBS.
6 For more detailed information, see You(2003).
7 The guarantee limit of the MBS Company was previously 30 times the equity capital
8 Although legal capital funds shall amount to two trillion won, the initial paid-in capital is 
320 billion won.
9 As of October 14, 2002. Kookmin Bank’s spread between the 1-year term variable rate 
mortgages and 3-month term variable rate mortgages was 188 bps., and Woori Bank’s 
spread was 92 bps.
10 IFC bought KoMoCo MBS in the amount of 106 billion won.
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